Hearings held in a city do not make it the seat of arbitration
23 September 2026
In Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. GSCO Infrastructure (2026 INSC 1038), the Orissa High Court referred a dispute to an arbitrator without naming a seat, and hearings happened to be held at Cuttack. The High Court later held that only Cuttack's courts could hear a challenge to the award. The Supreme Court disagreed: the seat fixes which courts supervise the arbitration, the venue is only where hearings take place, and holding hearings somewhere does not make it the seat. With no seat chosen, the District Judge at Sundargarh, where the work was done, could hear the Section 34 petition.
Background. The seat-venue distinction comes from BALCO (2012) and was refined in Indus Mobile (2017) and BGS SGS Soma (2019). Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is the route to set an award aside.
Why CLAT asks: Seat versus venue is now a staple of legal-reasoning questions on arbitration.
Source: Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. GSCO Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., 2026 INSC 1038 (Supreme Court, 23 September 2026)
A non-signatory can be joined to an arbitration as a 'veritable party'
12 October 2026
In Hemant D. Shah HUF v. Chittaranjan D. Shah HUF (12 October 2026), two partners who joined a firm in 2009 had never signed the 1985 deed with the arbitration clause, and the High Court refused to make them parties to the arbitration. The Supreme Court held that, apart from the recognised routes (claiming through a signatory, or the group of companies doctrine), a non-signatory whose rights will be substantially affected by the outcome is a 'veritable party' and may be referred to arbitration. Their 2009 deed was valid only if the appellants' earlier retirement was, so the dispute directly touched them.
Background. Arbitration rests on consent, which is why non-signatories are normally outside it. In Cox and Kings v. SAP India (2023) a Constitution Bench upheld the group of companies doctrine.
Why CLAT asks: Consent is the foundation of arbitration; questions test the exceptions that bind people who did not sign.
Source: Hemant D. Shah HUF v. Chittaranjan D. Shah HUF (Supreme Court, 12 October 2026)
An oral contract can be enforced, but it must first be proved
29 September 2026
In Bombay Garage Ahmedabad Ltd. v. J P Iscon Pvt. Ltd. (29 September 2026), two courts had ordered specific performance of an alleged oral agreement to sell land, largely because the defendants' witnesses were evasive. Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran agreed that specific performance can rest on an oral agreement, but held that evasive answers from the other side cannot replace the plaintiff's own burden of proving a concluded contract with agreed terms such as the price. The plaintiff had not proved one, and the suit was dismissed.
Background. Under the Contract Act, 1872 a contract need not be in writing unless a law requires it. The Specific Relief Act, 1963, as amended in 2018, makes specific performance the normal remedy rather than a discretionary one.
Why CLAT asks: Offer, acceptance and certainty of terms are the first chapter of contract law, and burden of proof is the second.
Source: Bombay Garage Ahmedabad Ltd. v. J P Iscon Pvt. Ltd. (Supreme Court, 29 September 2026)
An unregistered agreement to sell gives no title
16 October 2026
In Rano Singh v. Gurbax Singh (2026 INSC 1137), heirs claimed possession in a suit filed in 1975 on the strength of an unregistered agreement to sell from 1960. The Supreme Court held that an agreement to sell confers no title, which passes only by a registered sale deed; that Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act (part performance) protects a buyer already in possession but cannot be used to claim possession; and that the claim was long time-barred, with years of inaction amounting to acquiescence.
Background. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 says a sale of immovable property worth ₹100 or more must be by a registered instrument, and that a contract for sale does not by itself create any interest in the property. In Suraj Lamp (2011) the Court held that sales by 'GPA' or agreement do not transfer title.
Why CLAT asks: Section 53A is a shield, not a sword: one of the most quoted lines in property law.
Source: Rano Singh v. Gurbax Singh, 2026 INSC 1137 (Supreme Court, 16 October 2026)
A Hindu widow's limited estate becomes full ownership under Section 14
22 September 2026
In Ganapati v. Prabhakar (2026 INSC 1033), a man died in 1949, leaving a son by his first wife and a second wife, Kashibai, with two daughters. The son claimed the house as sole owner. The Supreme Court held that Kashibai took a limited estate under the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, which became absolute ownership when the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force, under Section 14(1), whether or not there had been a partition. Her daughters' claim through her succeeded.
Background. Section 14(1) converts any property possessed by a Hindu woman into her absolute property. The 2005 amendment made daughters coparceners by birth, and Vineeta Sharma (2020) held that the right does not depend on the father being alive in 2005.
Why CLAT asks: Section 14 and the 2005 amendment are the two Hindu succession rules CLAT returns to.
Source: Ganapati v. Prabhakar, 2026 INSC 1033 (Supreme Court, 22 September 2026)
Child custody: the child's welfare, not the 'tender years' presumption
23 September 2026
In Debarati Bhunia Chakraborty v. Suman Sankar Bhunia (2026 INSC 1043), the Supreme Court held that the 'tender years doctrine', the presumption that very young children belong with their mother, cannot decide custody on its own. The only paramount consideration is the welfare and best interest of the child on the facts. On those facts it let the mother take the children to the United Kingdom for schooling, on an undertaking to produce them in India when required, and kept final custody open.
Background. Custody is governed by the Guardianship and Wards Act, 1890, and for Hindus also by the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, whose Section 6(a) says custody of a child under five shall ordinarily be with the mother. The 'best interest of the child' is also a principle of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015.
Why CLAT asks: A presumption versus a test of welfare: passages often ask which governs.
Source: Debarati Bhunia Chakraborty v. Suman Sankar Bhunia, 2026 INSC 1043 (Supreme Court, 23 September 2026)
When an Indian court may stop a spouse from litigating abroad
22 September 2026
In Mihir Prakash Bajoria v. Vidushi Jain Bajoria (2026 INSC 1034), a husband had obtained an injunction from an Indian court stopping his wife's divorce case in the United Kingdom. Relying on Modi Entertainment Network (2003), the Supreme Court said such anti-suit injunctions are granted sparingly: only against a party within the court's jurisdiction, where refusing would defeat justice, with respect for the foreign court (comity), and after asking whether the foreign forum is oppressive or plainly inconvenient (forum non conveniens). His argument that a UK divorce on irretrievable breakdown would be unenforceable in India under Section 13 CPC was premature. The injunction stayed vacated.
Background. Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure lists when a foreign judgment is not conclusive in India, for example where it is not on the merits or is founded on a ground Indian law does not recognise.
Why CLAT asks: Comity and forum non conveniens are the kind of unfamiliar-but-defined terms CLAT passages explain and then test.
Source: Mihir Prakash Bajoria v. Vidushi Jain Bajoria, 2026 INSC 1034 (Supreme Court, 22 September 2026)
A flat buyer's refund on the principle of unjust enrichment
15 October 2026
In Madhu Kudapa v. Lodha Healthy Constructions (2026 INSC 1131), a buyer had booked a flat on a bank loan under a tripartite arrangement, and the builder never delivered. The Supreme Court grounded the refund in Sections 68 to 72 of the Contract Act, the 'relations resembling those created by contract', and the maxim that no one should be enriched at another's loss. It directed release of about ₹1.27 crore with 12% interest and ₹15 lakh compensation, and upheld a finding that the bank was deficient in service for disbursing the loan without checking construction progress.
Background. Quasi-contracts impose obligations without an agreement: for example, Section 70 (benefit of a non-gratuitous act must be paid for) and Section 72 (money paid by mistake must be repaid).
Why CLAT asks: Contract or quasi-contract? Knowing the difference wins marks in legal reasoning.
Source: Madhu Kudapa v. Lodha Healthy Constructions and Developer Pvt. Ltd., 2026 INSC 1131 (Supreme Court, 15 October 2026)
