Creamy layer: a 2004 letter cannot override the 1993 rule on salary income
11 March 2026
In Union of India v. Rohith Nathan (2026 INSC 230), decided on 11 March 2026, OBC civil-services candidates whose parents worked in PSUs or private firms had been treated as creamy layer because their parents' salaries were counted. The Court held that a clarificatory letter of 2004 could not override the Office Memorandum of 8 September 1993, which leaves salary out of the income and wealth test. Until the government notifies which PSU and private posts are equivalent to government posts, such candidates are judged by the income and wealth test alone. Treating them worse than children of government servants would be hostile discrimination under Articles 14 and 16.
Background. The creamy-layer exclusion for OBCs comes from Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992), which also set the 50% ceiling on reservations. The 1993 memorandum was issued to implement it.
Why CLAT asks: An executive clarification cannot add a condition the parent instrument does not contain: a core administrative-law idea.
Source: Union of India v. Rohith Nathan, 2026 INSC 230 (Supreme Court, 11 March 2026)
Madhya Pradesh's 27% OBC quota struck down for breaching the 50% ceiling
9 October 2026
On 9 October 2026 the Madhya Pradesh High Court (Justices Anand Pathak and Vinay Saraf), in Ashita Dubey v. State of Madhya Pradesh, struck down a 2019 law raising OBC reservation in jobs and education from 14% to 27%. Added to 16% for Scheduled Castes and 20% for Scheduled Tribes, it took reservation above 50%, and the State's own data did not show the extraordinary circumstances Indra Sawhney requires to cross that line. Appointments made at 27% until 29 September 2022 were protected; for later recruitment the extra 13% goes to the unreserved category.
Background. Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil (2021) reaffirmed the 50% ceiling in striking down Maharashtra's Maratha quota. The 10% EWS quota of the 103rd Amendment, upheld in Janhit Abhiyan (2022), sits outside it.
Why CLAT asks: The 50% rule, its exceptions and the EWS twist are among the most likely reservation questions.
Source: Ashita Dubey v. State of Madhya Pradesh, W.P. No. 5901 of 2019 (Madhya Pradesh High Court, 9 October 2026)
Backward-class status does not travel with a person who changes religion
15 October 2026
In Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu v. Sameer Ahamed N. (2026 INSC 1129), a government order let people who had been SC, MBC or BC before converting to Islam claim a notified 'Backward Class Muslim' category. The Supreme Court upheld the Madras High Court's decision quashing it. Reservation under Article 16(4) follows a community's backwardness within the social order the person belongs to; leaving that order by conversion does not carry the status into a different category. A community certificate only declares a status that exists; it cannot create one.
Background. Paragraph 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 limits SC status to those professing Hinduism, Sikhism or Buddhism.
Why CLAT asks: A certificate declares, it does not create: a neat legal-reasoning point beside the conversion question.
Source: Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu v. Sameer Ahamed N., 2026 INSC 1129 (Supreme Court, 15 October 2026)
Article 311: removal is barred only by an authority junior to the one who appointed you
24 September 2026
In Union of India v. Ramdhani Prasad (2026 INSC 1047), a Railway Protection Special Force constable removed in 1983 argued that he had been appointed by the Commandant and removed by a junior officer. The Supreme Court held that the call letter for training was conditional and not an appointment; the real appointment was the later Battalion Order by the Assistant Commandant, and the officer who removed him was not junior to that authority. Article 311(1) was not breached, and the removal was restored.
Background. Article 311(1): no civil servant may be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to the one that appointed him. Article 311(2): no dismissal, removal or reduction in rank without an inquiry and a reasonable opportunity to be heard, with three exceptions.
Why CLAT asks: Both clauses of Article 311, and its exceptions, are frequent service-law questions.
Source: Union of India v. Ramdhani Prasad, 2026 INSC 1047 (Supreme Court, 24 September 2026)
An 'outstanding' officer's compulsory retirement quashed as colourable
9 September 2026
In S.S. Das v. Union of India (2026 INSC 980), an Indian Trade Service officer graded 'Outstanding' for two decades, and promoted to Joint Secretary months earlier, was compulsorily retired in 2018 under Fundamental Rule 56(j) on the strength of a note relaying unwritten industry complaints. The Supreme Court called the note 'not worth the paper it had been written on', found malice writ large, and held that branding him dead wood in the 'public interest' was a colourable exercise of power. It ordered all benefits with notional promotion, a ceremonial farewell, ₹6 lakh costs and ₹9 lakh for loss of reputation.
Background. FR 56(j) lets the government retire an employee in the public interest after a set age (50 or 55) with notice, and it is not a punishment. Courts review it only for mala fides, absence of material, or arbitrariness.
Why CLAT asks: Colourable exercise of power and malice in law are standard administrative-law terms.
Source: S.S. Das v. Union of India, 2026 INSC 980 (Supreme Court, 9 September 2026)
Maharashtra's methanol rules fail the proportionality test
18 September 2026
In Balaji Formalin Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (2026 INSC 1009), the Supreme Court struck down Rules 18A and 18B of the Maharashtra Poisons Rules, 1972, added after a 1991 hooch tragedy, which required methanol to be mixed with a colourant and bitterant and allowed confiscation of unlicensed stock. Preventing hooch deaths was a legitimate aim, but the rules would not achieve it and less restrictive measures, such as proper enforcement against pilferage, existed. They violated Articles 14 and 19(1)(g). The Court then issued directions to the States on licensing, stock checks, sealed tankers and hospital cells for liquor tragedies.
Background. The four-part proportionality test (legitimate aim, suitability, necessity, balancing) was adopted in Modern Dental College (2016) and K.S. Puttaswamy (2017). Article 19(6) allows reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade.
Why CLAT asks: Apply the four prongs in order: this case fails at suitability and necessity.
Source: Balaji Formalin Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 INSC 1009 (Supreme Court, 18 September 2026)
A professional course's fee cannot be changed once students have joined
14 October 2026
In Dr. B.C. Roy Engineering College v. State of West Bengal (14 October 2026), a college tried to apply a fee revised after the session began to a B.Tech batch already enrolled. Drawing on T.M.A. Pai Foundation and P.A. Inamdar, the Supreme Court held that fee fixation committees are quasi-regulatory bodies whose decisions are fully reviewable, and that the whole course fee must be known before admission and varied midway only in exceptional cases, such as an unforeseen rise in costs. It blamed the State's delay in notifying the fee.
Background. T.M.A. Pai Foundation (2002, eleven judges) recognised private institutions' right to run educational institutions under Article 19(1)(g) but barred capitation fees and profiteering. P.A. Inamdar (2005) upheld fee regulation committees.
Why CLAT asks: Institutional autonomy against students' certainty: a balance passages love.
Source: Dr. B.C. Roy Engineering College v. State of West Bengal (Supreme Court, 14 October 2026)
