24 September 2026
Supreme Court issues nationwide safeguards against misuse of POCSO complaints in custody battles
In a custody dispute between a father ('R') and mother ('E'), the Supreme Court found that a POCSO Act complaint filed by the mother against the father, alleging sexual assault of their child, was engineered to regain custody after the Court had earlier confirmed custody with the father. A CBI investigation found the case not maintainable, and the Court (J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ., 24 September 2026) quashed the FIR, restored legal custody to the father, and directed a Family Court-supervised, expert-assisted process — involving CBI officers and NIMHANS child psychiatry and psychology faculty — to reintegrate the child with the father. Beyond the case, the Court laid down safeguards to prevent misuse of the POCSO Act in matrimonial litigation. Where a POCSO offence is alleged against a parent or a family member living with the child, and a matrimonial dispute exists between the parents, police must verify the dispute at the time of the complaint and avoid hasty arrest; courts deciding bail or remand must examine whether the arrest decision accounted for the strained relationship; and District Child Protection Units must maintain updated panels of child psychiatry and psychology experts under the POCSO Rules, 2020, to assist before coercive action is taken. The Court also endorsed the Kerala High Court's view that mere registration of a POCSO case should not defeat a parent's custody claim. The judgment is to be circulated to every High Court and police station in the country.
Why it matters for CLAT. Tests the interface between the POCSO Act's protective, victim-centric design and due-process safeguards against arrest, echoing the Arnesh Kumar line of cases on Section 498A IPC — a classic CLAT theme of balancing child protection with the risk of criminal law being weaponised in matrimonial disputes.
Quick check: Under the safeguards laid down by the Supreme Court in this case, when do special precautions against hasty arrest apply to a POCSO complaint?
- Whenever the accused is a first-time offender
- When the offence is alleged against a parent or co-resident family member, and a matrimonial dispute exists between the child's parents
- Only where the child victim is below the age of seven
- Whenever the complaint is filed more than one year after the alleged offence
Answer: B. The Court held the safeguards apply only where two threshold conditions are met together: the accused is a parent or a family member living under the same roof as the child, and a matrimonial dispute exists between the parents — a fact the police must verify on receiving the complaint.
Read the source: Supreme Court of India: judgment in 'R' v. 'E' & Ors., 2026 INSC 1049 (24 September 2026)
23 September 2026
Split Supreme Court bench sends Election Commissioners Appointment Act challenge to larger bench
A batch of writ petitions under Article 32 — led by Dr. Jaya Thakur and including the Association for Democratic Reforms and the People's Union for Civil Liberties — challenge Sections 6, 7 and 8(2) of the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 as ultra vires Articles 14 and 324. Section 7 fixes the Selection Committee for the CEC and Election Commissioners as the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister — a composition enacted after the Constitution Bench in Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023) 6 SCC 161 had held that the Election Commission must be insulated from exclusive executive control in appointments. A two-judge bench (Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.) heard the petitions over five days on whether the challenge required reference to a Constitution Bench under Article 145(3). The judges split: Datta, J. held that only the settled Anoop Baranwal principle needed to be applied to the 2023 Act, so no reference was necessary; Sharma, J. held that the vires of the Act called for independent examination by five judges. Rather than referring this narrower disagreement to a three-judge bench and causing further delay, both judges jointly directed that the papers be placed before the Chief Justice of India to consider constituting a Constitution Bench to decide the validity of Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the 2023 Act.
Why it matters for CLAT. Builds directly on Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023) on the independence of the Election Commission from executive control, and illustrates the Article 145(3) procedure for referring a constitutional question to a larger Bench.
Quick check: In Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023), what did the Supreme Court hold about the appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner and Election Commissioners?
- That the President can remove an Election Commissioner without following the procedure for removing the CEC
- That such appointments are purely an executive function immune from judicial review
- That only sitting High Court judges are eligible for appointment as Election Commissioners
- That the Election Commission must be insulated from exclusive executive control in the matter of such appointments
Answer: D. Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023) 6 SCC 161 held that the ECI must be insulated from exclusive executive control in appointments — the very principle the petitioners in this case say Section 7 of the 2023 Act violates by giving the executive a majority on the Selection Committee.
Read the source: Supreme Court of India: judgment in Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Union of India, W.P.(C) No. 14/2024, 2026 INSC 1040 (23 September 2026)
23 September 2026
Supreme Court: holding arbitration hearings at a place does not make it the 'seat' of arbitration
Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd had a works contract with GSCO Infrastructure Pvt Ltd that contained no arbitration clause. After disputes arose, the Orissa High Court, in a writ petition, referred the matter to a sole arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 without specifying any seat or venue; the arbitral proceedings were then conducted at Cuttack, where the High Court sits, apparently for the arbitrator's convenience. After an award was passed in GSCO's favour, Mahanadi Coalfields filed petitions under Section 34 of the Act to set the award aside before the District Judge, Sundargarh — the district where the underlying works were performed. The High Court held these petitions were not maintainable, reasoning that Cuttack, where the hearings were held, was the 'seat' of arbitration, so only courts there had supervisory jurisdiction, and that the petitions were also time-barred. The Supreme Court (Sanjay Kumar and Sanjeev Sachdeva, JJ.) set this aside. It reiterated the distinction between 'seat' — which fixes the courts with supervisory jurisdiction — and 'venue', which is merely the physical location of hearings, relying on BALCO, Indus Mobile Distribution and BGS SGS Soma JV. Since neither the parties nor the referral order had designated Cuttack as the seat, conducting hearings there did not confer jurisdiction on its courts. Absent an express seat, any court within the High Court's territorial jurisdiction competent to entertain a Section 34 petition — here, the District Judge, Sundargarh — could hear it. The petitions were restored.
Why it matters for CLAT. Tests the 'seat' versus 'venue' distinction in arbitration law — a frequently examined point after BALCO — and how it determines which court has supervisory jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to set aside an award.
Quick check: Under the law reiterated in this judgment, what is the key legal significance of the 'seat' of arbitration, as distinct from its 'venue'?
- The seat determines which court exercises supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration, while the venue is merely the physical place where hearings are held
- The seat determines the language of the arbitral proceedings
- The venue, and not the seat, determines which court can entertain a Section 34 petition
- The seat and venue are legally interchangeable terms with no distinct consequence
Answer: A. Relying on BALCO, Indus Mobile Distribution and BGS SGS Soma JV, the Court held that the 'seat' fixes supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration, whereas the 'venue' is only the physical location of hearings and does not, by itself, confer jurisdiction on the courts there.
Read the source: Supreme Court of India: judgment in Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. GSCO (Gurmeet Singh and Company) Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., 2026 INSC 1038 (23 September 2026)