Only a constitutional court can order life imprisonment without remission
24 September 2026
In Naval Kishore v. State of Punjab (2026 INSC 1048), the trial court had sentenced two men convicted of murdering a woman and her two daughters to life with a direction that they stay in prison for the rest of their lives. The Supreme Court held that an ordinary life sentence remains subject to the government's remission powers under Sections 432 to 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and that only a constitutional court, the High Court or the Supreme Court, can impose a 'special category' sentence that excludes remission. The Sessions Court's direction was incompetent; the Court substituted 25 years without remission.
Background. The 'special category' sentence comes from Swamy Shraddananda (2008) and was confirmed by the Constitution Bench in Union of India v. V. Sriharan (2015). The executive's remission power sits beside the President's and Governors' pardon powers under Articles 72 and 161.
Why CLAT asks: Which court can impose which sentence, and the difference between judicial sentencing and executive remission, are classic questions.
Source: Naval Kishore v. State of Punjab, 2026 INSC 1048 (Supreme Court, 24 September 2026)
Death sentence commuted: the State must prove reform is impossible
24 September 2026
In Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2026 INSC 1050), a stepfather had been sentenced to death for the sexual assault and murder of a child. The Supreme Court applied the two tests from Bachan Singh: the crime test (are the aggravating circumstances so grave?) and the criminal test (is reform conclusively ruled out?), with the burden on the State on the second. The State had not shown that reform was impossible, so the Court commuted the sentence to imprisonment for the rest of his natural life without remission.
Background. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) upheld the death penalty but confined it to the 'rarest of rare' cases, where life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed. Machhi Singh (1983) set out categories of such cases.
Why CLAT asks: The 'rarest of rare' doctrine and its two tests are among the most tested ideas in criminal law.
Source: Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 INSC 1050 (Supreme Court, 24 September 2026)
Section 69 BNS: a broken promise to marry is not deceit unless false from the start
7 September 2026
In Kunal Rameshbhai Kalyani v. State of Gujarat (2026 INSC 987), an FIR under Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita alleged that the accused had sexual relations on a promise of marriage and then backed out because his mother objected. Following Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana (2013), the Court held that deceit requires proof that the accused never meant to keep the promise when he made it. The complaint itself described a consensual relationship, and the reason for the break-up suggested the promise had been made in good faith. The FIR was quashed.
Background. Section 69 of the BNS, 2023 is a new offence: sexual intercourse by 'deceitful means', which includes a false promise of marriage, up to ten years' imprisonment. The BNS replaced the Indian Penal Code on 1 July 2024.
Why CLAT asks: False promise versus broken promise is a perfect legal-reasoning distinction: intention at the time of the promise decides it.
Source: Kunal Rameshbhai Kalyani v. State of Gujarat, 2026 INSC 987 (Supreme Court, 7 September 2026)
Corruption cases: prove demand and acceptance first; no approval needed for a bribe demand
16 October 2026
In Bharat Raj Meena v. CBI (2026 INSC 999, 16 September), the Court acquitted a former railway police officer, holding, as the Constitution Bench did in Neeraj Dutta (2022), that the presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act arises only after the prosecution proves that a bribe was demanded and accepted. In Tejaram v. State of Rajasthan (2026 INSC 1147, 16 October), it held that the prior approval required by Section 17A before investigating a public servant covers only acts tied to an official decision or recommendation, not a bribe demand, which is a freestanding crime.
Background. Section 17A was added by the 2018 amendment to protect honest decision-making by public servants from investigation without the approval of the competent government.
Why CLAT asks: A statutory presumption does not relieve the prosecution of proving the foundational facts: a principle that also runs through NDPS and POCSO law.
Sources: Bharat Raj Meena v. CBI, 2026 INSC 999 (Supreme Court, 16 September 2026); Tejaram v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 INSC 1147 (Supreme Court, 16 October 2026)
A confession to the police cannot alone justify preventive detention
29 September 2026
In Mulla Afroz v. Union of India (29 September 2026), a man was detained under the National Security Act after the November 2024 violence in Sambhal, largely on a confession he made in police custody. Justices Dipankar Datta and Sheel Nagu held that a statement made to a police officer is inadmissible and cannot be the sole basis of the detaining authority's satisfaction, following Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, and overruled a Madras High Court Full Bench to the extent it had said otherwise. Finding no other credible material and a breach of Article 22's safeguards, the Court quashed the detention and imposed ₹10 lakh costs on Uttar Pradesh.
Background. Section 25 of the Evidence Act, now Section 23 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, makes a confession to a police officer inadmissible. Article 22(4) to (7) govern preventive detention: an Advisory Board must review detention beyond three months, and the detenu must be told the grounds.
Why CLAT asks: Joins an evidence rule to a constitutional safeguard. Both halves are frequent questions.
Source: Mulla Afroz v. Union of India (Supreme Court, 29 September 2026)
Acquittal where the chain of circumstances breaks
1 October 2026
In Santosh Gurung v. State of Sikkim, decided on 1 October 2026, the Supreme Court acquitted a man whose conviction for the rape and murder of his niece rested on circumstantial evidence and had been upheld twice below. Applying Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, it said each circumstance must be fully proved and the chain must exclude every hypothesis but guilt. Here witnesses were unsure the two had left together, the recovery spot was open to the public, and DNA from the recovered bones did not match the victim's family. The accused's silence in his Section 313 statement could not complete the chain.
Background. The 'five golden principles' for circumstantial evidence were set out in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984), building on Hanumant (1952).
Why CLAT asks: The chain-of-circumstances test and 'last seen together' are perennial evidence questions.
Source: Santosh Gurung v. State of Sikkim (Supreme Court, 1 October 2026)
Fresh probe into a 2012 rape-murder, but the acquitted man cannot be tried again
21 September 2026
In Kusumavati Gowda v. Government of Karnataka (2026 INSC 1030), the Supreme Court ordered a fresh investigation by a new Special Investigation Team into the 2012 rape and murder of a 17-year-old student in Belthangady, saying the earlier investigations by the police, the CID and the CBI 'shock the very conscience of the court'. A fair investigation, it said, is part of Article 21, and the victim is not a stranger to the case. But the man already tried and acquitted cannot be investigated or prosecuted again, because of Article 20(2) and Section 300 of the CrPC.
Background. Article 20 gives three protections: no ex post facto criminal law (20(1)), no double jeopardy (20(2)), and no compulsion to be a witness against oneself (20(3)).
Why CLAT asks: Article 20's three clauses are tested constantly. This case shows 20(2) at work.
Source: Kusumavati Gowda v. Government of Karnataka, 2026 INSC 1030 (Supreme Court, 21 September 2026)
Long custody outweighs the PMLA's twin conditions for bail
14 October 2026
In Sanjay Sureka v. Directorate of Enforcement (14 October 2026), an accused in an alleged ₹6,210-crore fraud had spent 20 months in custody, with 97 co-accused, about 98 witnesses and some 15,000 pages of complaints to go through, against a maximum sentence of seven years. Following Manish Sisodia v. ED (2024), the Supreme Court held that Section 45's twin conditions cannot override Article 21 once incarceration is prolonged and the trial is far off, and granted bail. It also held that Section 19(2)'s duty to forward arrest material 'immediately' means promptly, not within a fixed deadline.
Background. Section 45 of the PMLA allows bail only if the court believes the accused is not guilty and is unlikely to offend on bail. 'Bail is the rule, jail the exception' traces to State of Rajasthan v. Balchand (1977).
Why CLAT asks: Personal liberty against a strict statute is a recurring passage theme.
Source: Sanjay Sureka v. Directorate of Enforcement (Supreme Court, 14 October 2026)
