Menstrual health is part of the right to life
30 January 2026
In Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Government of India (2026 INSC 97), decided on 30 January 2026, Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan held that Article 21 includes the right to menstrual health. Lack of menstrual hygiene measures, the Court said, undermines a girl's dignity and her equal participation in school under Article 14, and free education under Article 21A covers costs that would stop a child finishing elementary school. Every State and Union Territory must provide working, gender-segregated toilets with water in all schools, government and private, along with free sanitary napkins and safe disposal.
Background. Article 21A (the right to education for children aged 6 to 14) was added by the 86th Amendment in 2002 and is given effect by the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009.
Why CLAT asks: Watch how one judgment reads three Articles together and turns a negative right into duties on the State.
Source: Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Government of India, 2026 INSC 97 (Supreme Court, 30 January 2026)
Withdrawing life support: the best-interest test
11 March 2026
In Harish Rana v. Union of India (2026 INSC 222), decided on 11 March 2026, Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan dealt with a man in a persistent vegetative state for years. The Court held that nutrition and hydration given through a tube under medical supervision is medical treatment, not basic care. For a patient who cannot decide, the question is whether continuing treatment is in his best interest, starting from a strong presumption in favour of preserving life. It allowed treatment to be withdrawn, with palliative care at AIIMS, and directed that panels of doctors be kept ready for the medical boards.
Background. Passive euthanasia and advance medical directives ('living wills') were recognised in Common Cause v. Union of India (2018), building on Aruna Shanbaug (2011). Active euthanasia remains unlawful in India.
Why CLAT asks: Allowing death to occur is distinguished from causing it. Expect passages on consent for those who cannot give it.
Source: Harish Rana v. Union of India, 2026 INSC 222 (Supreme Court, 11 March 2026)
Maternity benefit for adoptive mothers, whatever the child's age
17 March 2026
In Hamsaanandini Nanduri v. Union of India (2026 INSC 246), decided on 17 March 2026, the Court looked at Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020, which gave maternity benefit only to women adopting a child below three months. It found no rational link between that cut-off and the purpose of the benefit, which is about motherhood and not childbirth, and noted that a child is rarely declared free for adoption that young. It read the provision as giving twelve weeks of benefit from the day the child is handed over, and urged the Union to provide paternity leave.
Background. A classification is valid under Article 14 if it rests on an intelligible differentia and that differentia has a rational nexus with the law's object. Reading down a provision saves it instead of striking it out.
Why CLAT asks: The two-part classification test is one of the most common legal-reasoning principles. This case applies it cleanly.
Source: Hamsaanandini Nanduri v. Union of India, 2026 INSC 246 (Supreme Court, 17 March 2026)
The right to walk on a safe footpath is a fundamental right
19 June 2026
In Maniyar Iliyaz @ Shaik Riyaz v. P. Ayyappan (2026 INSC 647), decided on 19 June 2026 by Justices P.S. Narasimha and A.S. Chandurkar, a five-year-old walking to school with his father was killed by a tanker on a road with no footpath. Raising the compensation, the Court held that the right to walk on safe, demarcated footpaths is part of the freedom of movement under Article 19(1)(d), read with Article 21. The right is subject to reasonable restrictions, but pedestrians have priority on footpaths over motor vehicles. Road-owning authorities must provide and maintain footpaths, and the Court sent the judgment to the Law Commission and the ministries concerned to consider a statutory framework.
Background. Article 19(1)(d) guarantees the right to move freely throughout India. Restrictions are allowed under Article 19(5) in the interests of the general public or of Scheduled Tribes.
Why CLAT asks: A good example of a new right being read out of an existing Article, with the State's duties following from it.
Sources: Supreme Court Observer: Fundamental Right to Walk; The Hitavada: Right to walk on demarcated footpath is fundamental right: SC (20 June 2026)
Karnataka High Court upholds paid menstrual leave
15 April 2026
On 15 April 2026 the Dharwad Bench of the Karnataka High Court, in Chandravva Hanamant Gokavi v. State of Karnataka, upheld the State's menstrual leave policy and directed that it be strictly implemented. The policy gives women employees aged 18 to 52 one day of paid leave a month, up to 12 a year, without carry-forward. The Court grounded it in Article 15(3) and the directive principles in Articles 39(e) and 42, and held that menstrual health, dignity and bodily autonomy are part of Article 21. It asked the State to extend guidelines to unorganised-sector workers. Other challenges to the policy remain pending before the Principal Bench.
Background. Article 15(3) allows special provisions for women and children. Article 42 directs the State to secure just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief.
Why CLAT asks: Is special treatment for women discrimination or equality? Article 15(3) is the answer CLAT expects you to know.
Sources: DLA Piper: Karnataka High Court mandates strict enforcement of menstrual leave policy; Mondaq: Menstrual leave in Karnataka: what the High Court judgment means for employers
A 30-week pregnancy: the choice rests with the minor and her parents
30 April 2026
On 24 April 2026 a Bench of Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan allowed a 15-year-old rape survivor to end a pregnancy of more than 30 weeks, holding that a court cannot force a woman, least of all a minor, to carry a pregnancy against her will. AIIMS, Delhi filed a curative petition. On 30 April a Bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi refused to entertain it, saying the decision rests with the minor and her parents, not the hospital. During the hearing the Bench remarked that there should be no time limit where a pregnancy results from rape.
Background. Under the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 as amended in 2021, a pregnancy can be ended up to 20 weeks on one doctor's opinion and up to 24 weeks for special categories, including rape survivors and minors, on two doctors' opinion. Beyond 24 weeks it is allowed for substantial foetal abnormalities on a medical board's opinion. Courts have allowed later terminations case by case under Article 142 and Article 21.
Why CLAT asks: Reproductive autonomy under Article 21 against a statutory time limit is a likely passage. Note that the 'no time limit' line was a remark at a hearing, not a holding.
Sources: The Tribune: AIIMS doctors must terminate 30-week pregnancy of minor rape victim, says SC; The Tribune: Remove time limit on rape victims' MTP: SC
Education in one's mother language and Article 19(1)(a)
12 May 2026
In Padam Mehta v. State of Rajasthan (2026 INSC 476), decided on 12 May 2026, the Supreme Court said the right to receive education in one's mother language rests on Article 19(1)(a): freedom of expression includes the right to receive information in a form one understands. Relying on State of Karnataka v. Associated Management of English Medium Primary and Secondary Schools (2014), it directed Rajasthan to introduce Rajasthani as a subject in all schools, government and private, in phases, and to file a compliance affidavit by 25 September 2026.
Background. Article 350A asks every State to provide instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage for children of linguistic minorities. In the 2014 Associated Management case, the Court held that the State cannot compel the mother tongue as the medium of instruction.
Why CLAT asks: Note the balance: a right to learn in one's language, but no power in the State to force a medium of instruction.
Source: Padam Mehta v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 INSC 476 (Supreme Court, 12 May 2026)
